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Kilpinen: Herring v. United States: A Threat to Fourth Amendment Rights?

Comment
HERRING V. UNITED STATES: A THREAT TO
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS?†
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy by forbidding
unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant.1 The Fourth
Amendment grew out of the colonists’ experience with excessive
searches and seizures, which the English used as tools of censorship and
tyranny.2 Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States developed
the exclusionary rule as a response to Fourth Amendment violations.3
The Court has shaped the rule by defining exceptions that limit its
application.4 One limitation the Court has established is the good-faith
exception, which seeks to minimize the social costs5 of exclusion by
allowing evidence when law enforcement officials conduct
unconstitutional searches and seizures in good faith.6 In Herring v.
Winner of the 2009 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition.
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1983). Stewart
outlines the history of searches and seizures grounded in the English general warrant and
writ of assistance, which were viewed as a threat to individual liberty. Id. at 1369–71.
Stewart suggests that this perspective led the Framers to craft the Fourth Amendment. Id.
3
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (establishing the exclusionary rule as
mandatory); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (forbidding use of improperly
obtained evidence at trial). See generally Stewart, supra note 2, at 1372–77 (summarizing the
slow progression of jurisprudence that led to Weeks).
4
See Elizabeth Canter, Note, A Fourth Amendment Metamorphosis: How Fourth
Amendment Remedies and Regulations Facilitated the Expansion of the Threshold Inquiry, 95 VA.
L. REV. 155, 177–85 (2009) (discussing the constraints upon the exclusionary rule that
developed after Weeks).
5
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 257–58 (1983) (describing the cost of exclusion as
denying “the jury access to clearly probative and reliable evidence”); United States v.
Payner, 477 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (viewing exclusion as an impediment to the judicial factfinding process); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (describing the social costs
of exclusion as letting the criminal “go free because the constable has blundered”).
6
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (recognizing the good-faith exception
applied to errors of judicial personnel); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987)
(applying exception to warrantless searches in reliance on a statute); United States v. Leon,
†
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United States, the Court granted certiorari to interpret the application of
the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation resulting from
negligent police record-keeping.7 Weighing the deterrent effect of
exclusion against the social costs of suppressing the evidence, the Court
held, in a five-to-four decision, that the evidence should not be
suppressed because exclusion would not meaningfully deter merely
negligent clerical conduct of police personnel.8
This Comment first presents the facts of Herring v. United States.9
Next, this Comment outlines the legal background supporting Herring.10
Lastly, this Comment analyzes the Court’s decision in Herring and
assesses the current and future status of the exclusionary rule.11
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN HERRING V. UNITED STATES
In July, 2004, Bennie Dean Herring (“Herring”), a convicted felon,
drove to an Alabama Sherriff’s Department to recover an item from his
impounded car.12 An investigator had the county warrant clerk search
for outstanding warrants for Herring; when none were found, the clerk
contacted her counterpart in a neighboring county.13 The other clerk
found an active arrest warrant for Herring in the database, which was
relayed to the investigator.14 After requesting a copy of the warrant be
faxed to him, the investigator and a deputy immediately pursued
Herring and arrested him, which led to the discovery of
methamphetamine in his pocket and a pistol in his car.15

468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (establishing exception if police act “in objectively reasonable
reliance” on invalid warrant); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (“[Evidence]
should be suppressed only if . . . the law enforcement officer had knowledge . . . that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”).
7
129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009). The majority also indicated that the Court’s holding would
resolve any conflict among jurisdictions. Id. Compare United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d
1212 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying Herring’s motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence),
with Hoay v. State, 71 S.W.3d 573 (Ark. 2002) (excluding illegally obtained evidence as
result of police clerical error).
8
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
9
See infra Part II (laying out the pertinent facts of Herring v. United States).
10
See infra Part III (explaining the development of the exclusionary rule as a judicially
created mechanism for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights).
11
See infra Parts IV.A–B (analyzing the Herring decision and discussing its impact on the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
12
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
13
Id. Herring’s brief suggested that the investigator sought to arrest Herring for
personal reasons because he had information to connect Herring to a local murder. Id. at
705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
14
Id. at 698.
15
Id.
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Shortly after Herring’s arrest, the investigator learned that the
warrant was invalid because a clerical error in the neighboring county
prevented the database from being updated.16 Yet, Herring was still
indicted for illegal possession of the gun and methamphetamine.17
Before trial, Herring moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds.18 The trial court denied the motion based on the
investigator’s good-faith reliance on the warrant.19 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed and held that the error was merely negligent, not deliberate,
and the deterrent benefit of exclusion would be marginal or
nonexistent.20 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HERRING V. UNITED STATES
The Fourth Amendment allows governmental searches and seizures
only when proper measures are taken to protect the privacy rights of
citizens.22 In 1914, the Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule
when it suppressed illegally obtained evidence in Weeks v. United States.23
Weeks is the starting point in the evolution of exclusionary rule
jurisprudence.24
In 1949, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado described the exclusionary rule
as only one of the effective remedies available to the states to protect
Fourth Amendment rights, and did not extend the rule to the states.25 In
1961, however, Wolf was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio.26 In Mapp, the Court
Id.
Id. at 699. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006) prohibits possession of illegal drugs such as
methamphetamine.
18
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s rationale for
granting certiorari).
22
See supra note 1 (presenting text of the Fourth Amendment).
23
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). In Weeks, police violated the Fourth Amendment by invading
Weeks’s home without a warrant and confiscating his personal belongings. Id. at 387–88.
Police improperly retained part of the property to use at trial. Id. at 388. The Court
excluded the evidence because if it had been returned, it would have been unavailable at
trial. Id. at 398.
24
See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1380–89 (discussing three possible constitutional bases for
exclusion: (1) the Constitution itself; (2) the government’s interest in preserving its
integrity by preventing courts from reviewing tainted evidence and committing a second
Fourth Amendment violation; and (3) a constitutionally required remedy because it is the
only effective incentive for Fourth Amendment compliance).
25
338 U.S. 25, 27, 31 (1949).
26
367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). In Mapp, a woman was arrested, tried, and convicted of
possessing obscene materials, which were seized by police when they forced themselves
16
17
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held “that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution [was][] . . . inadmissible,” which solidified the rule
announced in Weeks as the constitutionally required remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations.27 Then, in 1974, the Court decided United States
v. Calandra, which resulted in a shift from exclusion as the rule to
exclusion as the exception, applicable only when it achieved a deterrent
effect.28
In subsequent cases, the Court limited exclusion to cases of flagrant,
official misconduct.29 The Court eroded the exclusionary rule further by
affording deference to magistrates in determining probable cause and to
police officers acting without warrants.30 Then, in 1984, the Court in
United States v. Leon established the good-faith exception, which
prevented exclusion unless it achieved a substantial deterrent effect.31
The Court reasoned that when an agent of the State conducted a search
that reasonably relied on an invalid warrant, the deterrent effect of
exclusion was minimal and insufficient to outweigh its social costs.32
Thus, Leon defined the good-faith exception and the balancing test that
would later support the majority opinion in Herring.33
After Leon, the Court applied the good-faith exception to cases
involving judicial and legislative errors.34 In 1995, Arizona v. Evans

into her home without a warrant claiming to be searching for a bombing suspect. Id. at
644–45. Mapp also applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 655.
27
Id. at 655–56.
28
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a judicially created
remedy to “safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect”).
See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it.”).
29
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978) (finding negligent police
miscommunications insufficient to invalidate a search); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486
(1976) (requiring deterrent effect before excluding illegally obtained evidence at trial);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (applying the exclusionary rule only when it
resulted in “appreciable deterrence[]”); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (applying the exclusionary rule only if the
State agent had knowledge that the search was illegal).
30
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (affording deference to police
officers); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (requiring deference to magistrates).
31
468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). In Leon, a police officer executed a facially valid search
warrant that led to an arrest and the seizure of large quantities of illegal drugs. Id. at 902.
The trial court found no probable cause to support the warrant, yet determined that the
officer acted in good-faith. Id. at 903.
32
Id. at 919 (citing Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539 ; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).
33
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699–701 (2009).
34
See supra note 6 (citing cases where the Court applied the exclusionary rule to errors
committed by judicial and legislative personnel).
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applied the good-faith exception to the errors of court clerical
personnel,35 but refused to decide whether the exception applied to
errors committed by police personnel.36 The Court reasoned that the
exclusionary rule sought to curb police misconduct, not judicial
misconduct; that court employees were unlikely to intentionally violate
the Fourth Amendment; and that nothing suggested exclusion of the
evidence would deter similar errors.37 Justice O’Connor noted in a
concurring opinion, however, that systemic or recurring clerical errors
should trigger exclusion.38
In 2006, the Court considered the exclusionary rule again in Hudson
v. Michigan and held that a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule
did not require exclusion.39 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in the
five-to-four decision, depicted the exclusionary rule as a last resort, not a
first impulse in response to Fourth Amendment violations.40 Justice
Scalia also emphasized the increasing professionalism of police forces,
which implied that the exclusionary rule’s success made it less
necessary.41 Justice Kennedy, however, intentionally stated in his
concurring opinion that “the continued operation of the exclusionary
rule[] . . . is not in doubt.”42 In his dissent, Justice Breyer defended the
exclusionary rule as the primary tool for enforcing Fourth Amendment
rights.43 It was upon this stage of intra-Court dissonance regarding

514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995). In Evans, a policeman arrested Evans based on a warrant found
in the police database and seized marijuana from his car. Id. at 4. Evans sought exclusion
of the evidence because the warrant had been quashed before the arrest. Id. A court clerk’s
error had prevented the police database from being updated to reflect the change. Id. at 5.
36
Id. at 16 n.5.
37
Id. at 15–16.
38
Id. at 16–17. But see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8(e) (2004) (arguing that the Court in Evans should have focused
on systemic deterrence rather than specific deterrence of particular players within the
criminal justice system).
39
547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).
40
Id. at 591.
41
Id. at 598–99. But see Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary
Rule?, 45 TRIAL 52, 54 (2009) (commenting on the public’s instinct to trust police too much);
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1389 (stating that the only effective remedy to inspire police
officers to control their professional zeal and to avoid violations of the Fourth Amendment
is the exclusionary rule); Note, Retreat: The Supreme Court and the New Police, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1706 (2009) [hereinafter Retreat] (arguing against the easing of police regulation and
suggesting that improved professionalism makes it easier for the police to better
regulation, such as the exclusionary rule).
42
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). See Bradley, supra note 41, at 53 (labeling Kennedy as the critical fifth vote in
favor of keeping the exclusionary rule alive).
43
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and a weakening exclusionary rule
that Bennie Dean Herring entered.
IV. ANALYSIS OF HERRING V. UNITED STATES
A. The Herring Opinion
In granting certiorari in Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court
cited its intent to resolve a circuit split regarding the application of the
exclusionary rule to police personnel errors.44 Many wonder if the
Court’s intent was truly that narrow or if the Court used the case to
move toward overruling Mapp or eliminating the exclusionary rule
altogether.45 On its face, the Herring decision did not overturn Mapp, but
extended the good-faith exception by finding that the marginal
deterrence achieved by excluding evidence based on negligent police
error was not sufficient to overcome the social costs of exclusion.46
Chief Justice Roberts opened by introducing important premises of
the Court’s decision.47 First, Chief Justice Roberts accepted the parties’
assumptions that Herring’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.48
Next, Chief Justice Roberts used Supreme Court precedent to establish
the principle that exclusion of evidence is not guaranteed in the event of
a Fourth Amendment violation.49 Chief Justice Roberts then agreed with
the Eleventh Circuit and identified the nature of the police misconduct in
Herring as merely negligent.50
Endorsing Hudson’s holding that exclusion is a last resort, Chief
Justice Roberts reviewed the established constraints on the exclusionary
44
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009). See also supra note 7 (noting that
the Court also sought to resolve a split on the issue among the federal circuits).
45
See Canter, supra note 4, at 202 (questioning whether Herring will “erode the
exclusionary rule as substantially as its rhetoric suggests”); Todd C. Berg, Ruling by U.S.
Supreme Court May Extend Beyond ‘Good Faith’ Cases, MICH. LAWYER’S WEEKLY, Feb. 9, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 7602532 (noting that criminal law specialists view Herring as more
than mere interpretation of the good-faith exception); Bradley supra note 41, at 52; Adam
Cohen, Is the Supreme Court About to Kill Off the Exclusionary Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009,
at A22, available at 2009 WLNR 3010228 (describing a memo written during the Reagan
administration by Chief Justice Roberts supporting elimination of the exclusionary rule);
Barry Kamins, The Exclusionary Rule: Beginning of the End?, 241 N.Y. L. J. 3 (Apr. 6, 2009)
(considering whether Herring extended Evans or set the stage for overturning Mapp).
46
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
47
Id. at 699–700 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice
Roberts’ majority opinion).
48
Id. at 699. Chief Justice Roberts questioned this assumption, however, and briefly
commented that some searches based on faulty probable cause determinations would not
constitute a constitutional violation. Id.
49
Id. (tracing this concept from Weeks through Calandra, Leon, and Evans).
50
Id. at 700.
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rule in order to ascertain its applicability to Herring’s case.51 First, Chief
Justice Roberts affirmed deterrence of police misconduct as the goal of
the exclusionary rule.52 Chief Justice Roberts then validated the
deterrence standard enunciated in Leon that exclusion applied only when
appreciable deterrence can be achieved.53 Chief Justice Roberts rated the
social costs of exclusion as very high, which made the standards of
appreciable deterrence even higher when considering exclusion.54 Chief
Justice Roberts proffered as evidence of this standard the Court’s goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule, which was formulated in Leon,
Krull, and Evans, and was based on the lack of significant deterrent effect
the exclusionary rule had on judicial personnel and legislatures.55
Second, Chief Justice Roberts incorporated the culpability of law
enforcement conduct into the exclusionary rule analysis.56 Chief Justice
Roberts concurred with the Court that exclusion is most effective in
response to flagrant Fourth Amendment abuses.57 Noting that the Court
never applied the exclusionary rule to a case of nonrecurring, attenuated
negligence,58 the Chief Justice concluded that a “flagrant or deliberate
violation of rights[,]” not mere negligent behavior, was required to
trigger the exclusionary rule.59 Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts
addressed two misconceptions about exclusionary rule analysis. First,
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that analysis of deterrence and culpability
was an objective inquiry.60 And, second, the Chief Justice refuted the
implication that all record-keeping errors by police were immune from
exclusion.61 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts confronted Justice Ginsburg’s
concern about unreliable databases62 and conceded that routine errors or

Id. at 700–03.
Id. at 700.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 700–01. Chief Justice Roberts addressed the social costs standard in light of the
Leon balancing test weighing the deterrent benefits of exclusion against its social costs to
determine the exclusionary rule’s applicability. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
920–22 (1984).
55
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701. See supra notes 6, 34–37 and accompanying text.
56
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701–02.
57
Id. at 702.
58
Id.
59
Id. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that liability for negligence deters misconduct, but
contended its irrelevance because the deterrent effect of exclusion on negligent misconduct
did not outweigh its social costs. Id. at n.4.
60
Id. at 703 (responding to the claim that investigator that arrested Herring had an
ulterior motive in arresting Herring).
61
Id.
62
See infra note 69 and accompanying text (citing statistics suggestive of unreliable
government databases).
51
52
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patterns of Fourth Amendment violations by police record-keeping staff
were worthy of exclusion.63
Ultimately, the Court did not apply the exclusionary rule, and
Herring’s conviction was affirmed.64 After balancing the deterrent effect
of exclusion against the social costs to the justice system, the Court
concluded that the negligent police conduct that Herring experienced
did not generate sufficient deterrence to “‘pay its way’” and did not
involve any “systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
requirements.”65
In dissent,66 Justice Ginsburg argued that negligent record-keeping
by police personnel threatened individual liberty, can be deterred, and
lacked effective remedies besides exclusion.67
Justice Ginsburg
advocated for a forceful exclusionary rule to adequately protect Fourth
Amendment rights.68 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg described modern
technology as pervasive and unreliable,69 which created a palpable threat
to individual liberty.70 Noting the deterrent effect of tort liability for
negligence, Justice Ginsburg concluded that exclusion could—and
must—deter negligent record-keeping errors.71 Justice Ginsburg rejected

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (citing concurring opinions in Evans and Hudson).
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, dissented separately arguing that the good-faith exception
should only apply to non-police errors resulting in constitutional violations. Id. at 710–11
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg adopted “‘a more majestic
conception’” of the exclusionary rule as protecting privacy rights and limiting the
tyrannical power of the government, not just its agents. Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed Justice Ginsburg’s dissent because she relied
predominantly on dissenting opinions and secondary material. Id. at 700 n.2.
68
Id. at 706–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Calandra that
described the goals of exclusion to be deterrence of official misconduct, judicial collusion
with official lawlessness, and promotion of public trust in government by assuring citizens
that constitutional violations will not be tolerated). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968) (explaining that admitting evidence at trial “legitimize[d] the conduct” used to seize
the evidence, thus requiring exclusion in cases of misconduct to avoid blessing the
violation with official approval).
69
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 708–09 nn.3–5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (supporting her claim
with government statistics highlighting flaws in terrorist watch-list databases, government
employment verification systems, and criminal databases). See generally 122 HARV. L. REV.
1706, supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of modernizing and
professionalizing police forces).
70
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (depicting an innocent citizen being
stripped of his or her dignity by an illegal search caused by a public employee's database
management error).
71
Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63
64
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the result of weakening the exclusionary rule—leaving citizens with no
effective remedy to Fourth Amendment violations.72
B. Appraisal of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Future Post-Herring
Although seemingly on shaky ground, the exclusionary rule still
exists post-Herring. Adhering to exclusionary rule precedent, the
majority in Herring focused on balancing deterrence and social costs
while clarifying the role of culpability in the analysis, which implies the
vitality of the rule.73 Yet, underneath the majority’s holding lies a
conflicted Court74 and hints that the exclusionary rule is not as necessary
as it once was, suggesting Herring has broader implications on the
exclusionary rule.75 Omission of pertinent discussions reveals the
majority’s broader goals.
For example, the Court dismisses Mapp’s formative role in the
history of the exclusionary rule by omitting reference to its holding that
all illegally-obtained evidence is inadmissible in court.76 While the
majority correctly respects modifications to Mapp’s holding through the
good-faith exception, it fails to consider the full stature of the Fourth
Amendment’s constitutional guarantee that the exclusionary rule serves
to ensure.77 Additionally, the majority’s focus on deterrence as the sole
purpose of the exclusionary rule ignores the value of excluding evidence
to protect the integrity of the government.78 Calculating the social costs
of exclusion, Chief Justice Roberts also neglects the cost of public distrust
Id. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding the following limitations to an effective
remedy: (1) official immunity precluding a remedy through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), (2)
lack of any incentive for police to improve databases, and (3) insurmountable burden of
proof necessary for defendants to qualify for exclusion).
73
Id. at 704.
74
In both Herring and Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court returned fiveto-four decisions with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito constituting the majorities and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg
comprising the dissents. See generally, Kamins, supra note 45 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
role in limiting the majority’s ability to eliminate the exclusionary rule).
75
Supra note 41 and accompanying text (citing Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Hudson that
police professionalism makes civil liability sufficient as an incentive for officers to avoid
Fourth Amendment violations and presenting perspectives that challenge Justice Scalia’s
conclusions about how police officers behave).
76
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699–700. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
77
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (extending the exclusionary rule to the States and asserting the
need to protect the constitutional right of privacy equallyagainst the Federal Government
and the States given the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
78
See id. at 659 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72
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of the government that results from the good-faith exception. By
ignoring this “‘more majestic conception’” of exclusion,79 the majority
implies a prioritization of police interests over individual liberties.
Similarly, while the majority’s analysis announces a general approach to
determining the applicability of exclusion,80 it relies on established
standards of deference81 without acknowledging them or the resulting
increased burden of proof required to support exclusion.82 The Court’s
deferential approach and the increased burden of proof ultimately
eliminate any effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.83
Again, these omissions by the majority appear to dismiss any concern for
Fourth Amendment rights.
Taken together, these unspoken statements by the majority indicate
an underlying intent to eliminate the exclusionary rule.84 Justice Scalia’s
announcement in Hudson that increased police professionalism reduced
the need for the exclusionary rule adds credibility to this suggestion.85
Yet, it is not the potential loss of the exclusionary rule that needs to be
mourned, but the impending demise of the Fourth Amendment looming
post-Herring.
Decreased exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
undermines individual liberties and buttresses police power.86 The risks
of tyrannical power emerging from such a scenario led the Framers to
craft the Constitution and Bill of Rights as guarantees of individual

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 n.2.
See Bradley, supra note 41, at 53.
81
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
82
See Berg, supra note 45, paras. 14–15 (asserting that Herring could make life easier for
prosecutors by decreasing the number of cases where deliberate constitutional violations
could be proven); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1403 (predicting that a good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule would shift the police’s attention to what courts will allow rather
than what the Fourth Amendment requires, making it easier for police to avoid exclusion).
83
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709–10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See Canter, supra note 4, at 179–
83 (describing the contraction of the exclusionary rule resulting from deferential standards
toward local judges and police); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1389 (concluding that the
exclusionary rule represents the only effective remedy to Fourth Amendment violations).
84
See Cohen, supra note 45, at A22 (“[C]ritics of the exclusionary rule have high hopes
that the Roberts [C]ourt will take the ultimate step of overruling Mapp v. Ohio.”); Kamins,
supra note 45, at 3 (stating that some believe that “Herring has established a foundation for
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liberties.87 Should Herring lead to continuing erosion of the exclusionary
rule, a return to the constitutional abuses of the past could follow.88
V. CONCLUSION
Herring, although commendable for its loyalty to precedent,
espouses flawed reasoning and incomplete consideration of public
policy relative to the protection of constitutional rights. Consequently,
the future of the exclusionary rule remains unclear. Given the current
make up of the Court, the exclusionary rule is not likely to disappear
soon. Nevertheless, Herring symbolizes a step onto a slippery slope
necessitating renewed commitment to the foundational liberties
established in the Fourth Amendment, so as to avoid the risk of tyranny
that any future restrictions of the rule may create. If the exclusionary
rule is at risk, an alternative remedy that effectively ensures law
enforcement’s adherence to the Constitution is needed to protect the
valued right to privacy enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.89
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